I’ve been thinking
about the topic of cultural change and recently published a summary on this Blog (11 September 2018). It struck me as I read through it that there were things which led back to Wittgenstein, like my use of the idea of a “sample book”. But I hadn’t
read any Wittgenstein-related material let alone Wittgenstein himself since the
1980s. I thought I should retrace my steps and so I bought a copy of the Philosophical Investigations (PI) in the scrupulous modern edition (as a
student in the 1960s and 1970s, I used the second edition of 1958 and later
sold it when I felt I had no more use).
I have mixed feelings.
I’m still not convinced. Here are some thoughts.
Wittgenstein approaches his work in a territorial
spirit. He was of course a Professor of Philosophy in a feudal university, so
nothing new there. There is Philosophy and it isn’t Science. The sciences which
are mentioned in PI - physiology, psychology, maybe psychoanalysis - look for
causes whether in the present or the past. They are sometimes interesting,
sometimes not. True, psychology as Wittgenstein knew it (behaviourism, fanciful
“experiments ” using undergraduates) had very little going for it (See PI,
#307; Part II, #371). Philosophy, in contrast, is concerned with concepts and
grammar - though the PI locates those within “forms of life” and so sometimes reads
like a theoretical or philosophical anthropology or sociology - and has been read that way. Three
thoughts.
As people took on board his work, they
developed it in two directions. First, there was “conceptual analysis” which had
mixed success. Extended into areas like ethics or politics, it read as a rather
complacent and conservative rendering of what we think, disguised into what “we
say” - as if the student needed to learn etiquette. “When we use the word “democracy”
we mean …”. As a result, there is a lot of work in old issues of philosophical journals which is no longer read
by anyone. [An aside: in the late 1960s I attended Peter Winch’s seminars at
King’s College, London. An old man sat in the corner, Rush Rhees [1905 - 1989],
who had been one of Wittgenstein’s acolytes. Occasionally, he made a remark and
each time I felt that, well, it wasn’t quite up to what one would expect in a
graduate seminar. The remarks were banal. I put it down to his advanced age;
but looking now at his dates, that can’t have
been the explanation. ]
The “grammar” when linked into the idea
of “forms of life” fairly quickly yielded a sharp distinction between “sentence”
and “utterance”, semantics and pragmatics. As early as 1960, J L Austin moved
things on with How To Do Things With
Words which gets us thinking about situated utterances and the many things
they are used to do. In one direction, this helps clarify Wittgensteinian ideas
about (say) the way in which understanding might be an achievement rather than
a state. We say, “Now I understand!” when we feel we’ve achieved something,
that we’ve now got it, and can carry on unaided. We are not reporting a state
of mind. In another direction, Austin’s and then Grice’s work turned into
contemporary and highly technical linguistic pragmatics.
From (say) the 1970s, the development of
artificial intelligence, cognitive science, cognitive theory has often
proceeded in ways which has ignored territorial boundaries. Many
Wittgensteinians have been appalled. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
There have been extraordinary developments in both what we can do (using
machines, implants, what have you) and how we investigate what “forms of life”
might be natural to human beings. All this has come about by getting over the
prissiness of Wittgenstein’s territorial approach and also past his unreflected
thinking about "children", “training” and “ instruction”. (As a young man and a good Austrian Catholic, he clearly believed that error could be beaten out of children: go to Wikipedia for the details).
Wittgenstein does give the impression that he thinks that it would make no
difference if we had sawdust rather than brains between our ears. (see # 282 on
the “babble of a baby” as nonsense; #293 “the box might even be empty”;
#376;Part II, # 148 “The oddity of children’s drawings”). He also is at risk of
turning local empirical truths into necessary truths, a trap into which later
Wittgensteinains have fallen. Conversely, necessary truths are sometimes
missed:
#
249 “Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one”. And
truth-telling? There are plenty of
theorists who think that truth-telling isn’t learnt; it’s what comes naturally
to us and makes other language games possible.
Wittgenstein insists that his
investigations are not exercises in introspection or phenomenological
description (I don’t think the word “phenomenology actually occurs in PI; it
isn’t in the Index either). See for example # 232. But they often read as if
they are those things and when they do it’s often boring, though there are those
who have annexed Wittgenstein for phenomenology
or common sense. There are two specific shortcomings when he is working in this
introspective / phenomenological way.
I want to make a sharper use than does
Wittgenstein of the distinction between judgement
and intuition. We offer judgements as
guidance for other people - You’ve added that up correctly; in English, the
plural of sheep is sheep - but intuitions are simply
reports of how things strike us, as in the Müller-Lyer illusion where we report
that the lines look of unequal length.
I also want to distinguish two sense of agreement. It is a curious fact that
everyone agrees that the Müller-Lyer lines are unequal in length. But they
agree this distributively, without discussion
or participation in a “form of life” other than a natural one. The Müller-Lyer lines pick up a fact about human
vision, not about human culture. In contrast, there are things we agree collectively. That doesn’t mean that we
vote or even discuss (very much). All it means is that when we judge (for
someone else’s benefit) that the plural of sheep
is sheep we are confident enough
about what other people think / judge to use our own judgement to guide (say)
someone learning English. (Compare PI, # 234, 241; Part II, #346, #351). Of course, we may get it wrong
especially when we are over-reliant on local experience and think that everyone
shares our dialect.